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European companies invest too little. Instead, firms increasingly retain 
profits and build up large savings which contributes to low growth, ris-
ing inequality and financial instability. Boosting private investment, 
therefore, has become main priority for the new Commission. Based on 
new empirical evidence this policy paper proposes a novel strategy to 
achieve this goal: strengthening the bargaining position of labor.
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1 Introduction
Across Europe, companies invest too little .1 More than a decade after the last fi-
nancial crisis, average investment rates of European firms have still not recovered 
to pre-crisis levels and, in some large member states, they remain well below their 
historic average (see Figure 1) . This lack of private investment has not only damp-
ened economic growth and employment in the European Union . It is also a main 
reason for the yawning gap between productivity growth and capital formation in 
Europe and in other major economies such as the US and China .2 Boosting private 
investment has, thus, turned into a major priority for the new European Commis-
sion for both economic and geopolitical reasons .3 
The lack of private investment is especially surprising given that European com-
panies are awash with money . However, many profitable firms seem increasingly 
reluctant to use their revenues to pay higher wages, distribute dividends or invest . 
Consequently, Europe, in recent years, has witnessed a staggering trend towards 
rising corporate saving . More and more firms retain substantial proportions of 
their profits and park them in liquid financial assets and bank accounts .4 A key 
question for the new Commission is, therefore, how to persuade European com-
panies to put their cash to work .
So far, the Commission mainly seeks to achieve this goal either by mobilizing pri-
vate investment through public funding, for example, with the InvestEU program 
or by encouraging structural reforms in member states . This policy paper proposes 
a new strategy to bring down savings and stimulate investment: strengthening 
the bargaining position of labor . Analyzing data from a large number of advanced 
economies over the last 20 years, it shows that the rise in corporate saving has 
been especially pronounced in countries in which the influence of labor unions 
has declined . Moreover, exploiting a discontinuity provided by the German law 
on co-determination for a more causal analysis reveals a similar pattern at the 
firm-level . Granting workers legal authority in firms’ decision-making reduces sav-
ings . Contrary to what one might expect, this does not seem to be the result of 
higher wage payments . Instead, firms with stronger worker participation save less 
because they invest more . 
1 For the methodological and empirical background of this paper see Redeker (2019): “The 
Politics of Stashing Wealth – The Demise of Labor Power and the Global Rise of Corporate 
Savings”, CIS Working Paper, No 101 . 
2 European Investment Bank (2018): Investment Report 2018/19 – Retooling Europe’s Economy .
3 Commission (2019): Mission Letter – Commissioner-designate for Internal Market; European 
Commission (2019): Mission Letter – Executive Vice-President-designate for a Europe fit for 
the Digital Age. 
4 Chen, P; Karababounis, L; Neiman, B . (2017): The Global Raise of Corporate Saving. Journal 
of Monetary Economics, Vol .89, 1-19 .  
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Figure 1 – The Trajectory of Private Investment in Major European Economies. 
Data: Eurostat .
For the Commission this means rethinking its approach to corporate governance 
and labor market reforms . European corporate governance law provides ample op-
portunity for strengthening employees’ voice in firms’ decision-making but so far 
lacks the bite to do so . Similarly, structural reforms recommended to member states 
in the context of the European Semester often aim at increasing productivity by ef-
fectively undermining the bargaining position of labor . Rethinking approaches at 
both these levels would not only reduce savings and bolster investment; it would 
also fit very well into the priorities contained both in the European Pillar of Social 
Rights and the political guidelines set out by the new Commission President . 
2 The rise of corporate saving and why Europe 
should care about it
In recent years, the corporate sector in most EU countries has turned into a net 
lender to the rest of the economy . On aggregate, firms in most EU countries as 
well as in many other advanced economies today, thus, save more than they pay 
out or invest (see Figure 2) .5 This is a puzzling development . According to stand-
ard economic theories, firms should not only reinvest their profits but also go 
into debt to finance their operations and fund additional investments . After all, 
it is one of the fundamental ideas of market economies that companies take idle 
resources and put them to productive use . While single firms or sectors might 
temporarily deviate from this logic, the corporate sector, on aggregate, should, 
thus, borrow money from households or the government . Accordingly, firms in 
most European countries have been net creditors to the rest of the economy 
until the early 2000s . The fact that they increasingly have stopped doing so has 
major economic implications .  
5 See also  Dao, M .; Maggi, C . (2018): The Rise in Corporate Saving and Cash Holding in Ad-
vanced Economies: Aggregate and Firm Level Trends. IMF Working Paper, 18/262 . 
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Figure 2 – Corporate Saving of Non-Financial Corporations across Europe in 2017
First, the rise of corporate saving has been a major drag on growth and productiv-
ity . In most countries, savings have increased at the expense of firms’ investment 
in physical capital . Several studies also suggest that the increased build-up of cash 
reserves, in recent years, has prevented firms from undertaking expenditures that 
could have increased productivity .6 Second, rising corporate savings fuel economic 
inequality . These savings are financial assets held by the owners of companies . As 
company ownership in most European countries is concentrated at the top of the 
income distribution, rising savings have boosted the income of rich households . At 
the same time, lower investment spending and stagnating wage payments have 
weighed heavily on the economic situation at the lower end of the income distri-
bution .7 Finally, large corporate savings have been a major driver of the macroe-
conomic imbalances within the Eurozone . While the rise of corporate saving has 
occurred in many European countries, it has been especially pronounced in coun-
tries with large current account surpluses such as Germany and the Netherlands . 
In these countries, excess savings in the corporate sector, which went unabsorbed 
by larger government or household deficits, have contributed massively to capital 
exports and current account surpluses . Excessive corporate savings, thus, consti-
tute a key source of global and European financial instability .8 
6 Kim, H .; Kim, B .; Kronlund, M . (2019): Do Firms Save Too Much Cash? Evidence from a Tax on 
Corporate Savings.   
7 International Monetary Fund (2019): Germany – Selected Issues, July 10, 2019 . 
8 Klug, T; Meyer, E .; Schuler, T . (2018): The Corporate Saving Glut and the Current Account in 
Germany. Ifo Working Papers 280, 2018 . 
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3 The Rise of Corporate Saving and the Demise 
of Labor Power
Reducing corporate savings could not only support growth and investment but 
also decrease economic inequality and reduce macroeconomic imbalances in the 
Eurozone . So, what can be done? To some extent, the rise of corporate saving is 
rooted in structural factors difficult to address politically such as declining pric-
es for investment goods,9 increasing insecurity due to technological change and 
trade conflicts10 and growing market concentration11 in key industries . Another 
important driving factor has been the decline of effective tax rates on corporate 
profits in many advanced economies . This could be tackled politically but would 
need to be done mainly at national level . From a European perspective, another 
approach, therefore, could turn out to be more fruitful: strengthening the bargain-
ing position of labor .
The rationale behind this idea is simple . A number of developments ranging from 
financial deregulation, heightened global economic insecurity as well as the in-
creased valuation of large savings on stock markets have made it increasingly at-
tractive for firm owners and managers to retain profits and stash them in liquid 
assets on financial markets . However, this strategy is at odds with the interests of 
employees, who would prefer surplus profits to be used either for higher wages or 
real investments that secure their jobs in the long run . What happens to surplus 
revenues, therefore, also should therefore also depend on the influence that work-
ers and employees have in negotiations about the usage of profits . In fact, our new 
empirical evidence suggests that the demise of the bargaining position of labor 
has been a key factor in the rise of corporate saving . 
Starting with a broad overview across time and countries, Figure 3 shows that the 
rise of corporate savings is strongly associated with the demise of labor power . 
More specifically, it plots the modelled relationship between aggregate corporate 
savings and the share of workers and employees who are organized in trade un-
ions in 25 OECD countries . Holding constant all country- and year-specific factors 
as well as a wide range of other variables it shows that the rise of corporate sav-
ings has been especially pronounced in countries in which the influence of trade 
unions has significantly decreased . According to the most conservative estimates, 
for example, about 20% of the increase in corporate saving in Germany could be 
explained by a corresponding decline in trade union density .
9 Chen, P; Karababounis, L; Neiman, B . (2017): The Global Raise of Corporate Saving. Journal 
of Monetary Economics, Vol .89, 1-19 . 
10 Sánchez, J .; Yurdagul, E . (2013): Why are corporations holding so much cash?, The Regional 
Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of St . Louis, Issue Jan . 
11 Dao, M .; Maggi, C . (2018): The Rise in Corporate Saving and Cash Holding in Advanced Economies: 
Aggregate and Firm Level Trends. IMF Working Paper, 18/262 . 
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Figure 3 – The Relationship between Trade Union Density and Corporate Saving 
across Time. 
Data: Visser, (2019); Chen et al . (2019)12 
Of course, this broad pattern of correlation could be driven by a range of factors . 
A key question is, therefore, whether strengthening labor’s voice in firms’ deci-
sion-making does lower corporate saving and lead to more investment . Firm-level 
data from Germany suggests that it could . The German law on co-determination 
stipulates that companies with more than 2000 employees must fill half of their 
supervisory boards with labor representatives .13 In the German two-tier board sys-
tem, such supervisory boards are in charge of electing, monitoring, auditing, and 
dismissing the managing board, which is responsible for the day-to-day operation 
of the firm . Members of the supervisory boards in addition must be involved in all 
decisions of fundamental importance to the company such as strategic planning 
and larger financial decisions . Introducing parity co-determination of supervisory 
boards in this way substantially strengthens the influence of workers on firms’ de-
cision-making . We can make use of this arrangement to track more causally how 
this increase in worker participation affects savings and investment .
12 The Figure shows an added variable plot for a two-way fixed effect model with a Prais-Win-
ston transformation and panel-corrected standard errors . It covers the period between 1995 
and 2013 . In addition, the model controls for foreign direct investment (% GDP): real GDP 
growth, real interest rates, old age dependency ratios, corporate income taxes, the level of 
stock market capitalization and the share of routine tasks in total employment .  
13 Companies with less than 2000 but more than 500 employees are required to fill a third 
of their supervisory boards with labor representatives .  
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Figure 4 – The Effect of Co-Determination on Corporate Savings in German Firms. 
Dashed line indicates the 2000 employee threshold over which companies must 
implement parity co-determination. 
Points show average savings for local averages of companies . Data: Compustat .14 
Based on balance-sheet data from publicly listed firms in Germany, Figure 4 
shows that companies just above the 2000 employee threshold, which are le-
gally obliged to implement parity-codetermination, save significantly less than 
companies just below the legal cut-off . On average, parity on supervisory boards 
reduces the ratio of savings to total assets by about 4 percentage points . 
The German system also allows us to investigate why exactly savings go down . 
Table 1 shows that – contrary to what one might expect – strengthening the 
voice of workers in firms’ decision-making does not primarily increase wages (at 
least not to a statistically significant degree) . Instead, it leads to somewhat high-
er expenditure for other forms of labor compensation (i .e . expenses for worker 
training, pension funds etc .) but, above all, increases firm-level investment in 
physical capital . This suggests that employees do not primarily use their posi-
tion of authority to grab a larger share of the revenue pie but to push firms into 
boosting investment . It is important to note that these findings should be tak-
en with a grain of salt as balance-sheet information on wages and investment 
tends to be more scattered than for savings . However, they are very much in line 
with other recent studies that employ different methods and data but also find 
that co-determination in Germany is associated with higher capital investment 
and labor productivity .15  
14 More formally, the Figure shows the result of a regression discontinuity design (RDD) 
around the 2000 employee threshold . Savings are measured as cash and short-term assets 
which could be liquidated in less than a year . The bandwidth for the analysis is chosen ba-
sed on an optimal bandwidth calculator (see Imbens & Kalyanaraman, 2012) and includes 
254 observations . For more details and robustness tests see Redeker (2019): “The Politics of 
Stashing Wealth – The Demise of Labor Power and the Global Rise of Corporate Savings”, CIS 
Working Paper, No 101 . 
15 Jäge, S .; Schoefer, B .; Heining, J . (2019): Labor in the Boardroom.  
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Table 1: Effect of Parity-Codetermination on Spending Behavior
Dividends, Staff Expenses & Investment
Estimated 
Effect
p-value statistically 
significant
Dividends -0 .02 0 .033 √
Staff Expenses  
(Wages & Salaries)
0 .055 0 .287 ✗
Staff Expenses (Other) 0 .039 0 .001 √
Investment 0 .127 0 .027 √
Dividends compromise the total amount of dividends declared on all equity capital of the 
company . Staff expenses (wages & salaries) include all labor expenses that are linked to the 
direct remuneration of workers . Staff expenses (other) captures forms of indirect remune-
ration of labor such as employee benefits plans and other social expenditure, pension and 
retirement expenses as well as social security contributions . The items are scaled by firm 
size measured in total assets . Investment is defined as the capital growth rate measured in 
annual changes of total investment (Peters and Taylor, 2017) divided by lagged total assets . 
Estimate is the average treatment effect at the 2000 employee cutoff estimated with local 
linear regressions with a triangular kernel and MSE-optima bandwidth . Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level . 
4 New European Policies for Unlocking the  
Piggy Bank
Strengthening the bargaining position of workers and employees in firms’ deci-
sion-making may, we have seen, reduce savings and stimulate investments . From 
a European perspective, there are two areas which could provide particularly fruit-
ful starting points for achieving this goal: strengthening the legal framework for 
workers’ participation in European corporate law and rethinking the Commission’s 
approach to structural labor market reforms in the European Semester . 
4.1 Strengthening Workers’ Participation at European Level
To enable workers to influence firms’ savings and investment decisions, Europe-
an policymakers should seek to strengthen the legal framework for workers’ par-
ticipation in European corporate law . Article 153 TFEU allows the Union to com-
plement and support member state activities in the area of information and 
consultation of workers (e) as well as the representation and collective defense 
of workers’ interests, including co-determination (f) . To this end, the Union can 
adopt measures designed to encourage cooperation amongst member states but 
also set minimum requirements for gradual implantation . Arguably, the political 
hurdles for such measures are high given that they require unanimous support in 
the Council . Nonetheless, recent years have seen a range of EU activities in these 
areas, which could be built upon . 
“Strengthening  
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On the one hand, existing regulations could be improved . For example, the EU 
already mandates member states to provide employees in companies of a certain 
size that operate in more than one European country the right to establish Euro-
pean Works Councils (EWCs) . In theory, management should inform and consult 
these councils on business progress as well as on any significant decision at Eu-
ropean level .16 In practice, however, the directives on EWCs are often criticized for 
lacking sanctions in case of non-compliance and providing only very weak infor-
mation and consultation rights . Strengthening the legal framework for EWCs and 
turning them into tools for active worker participation could, therefore, signifi-
cantly boost the voice of workers at the European level . 
Moreover, the Commission could increase employee influence in companies op-
erating under European law such as Societas Europaea (SEs) . Currently, SE regu-
lations and other directives that aim at facilitating cross-border operations and 
mergers are often criticized for making it too easy for firms to dodge national 
forms of co-determination by changing to European legal forms .17 By proactive-
ly establishing participation rights in European firms, the Commission could not 
only prevent legal evasion but also decrease savings by directly strengthening the 
bargaining position of workers in big European firms . 
Finally, the Commission should make employee participation a key priority in its 
approach to regulating European corporate governance more generally . In recent 
years, European institutions have often strengthened the rights of other compa-
ny stakeholders and especially minority shareholders, for example, through the 
recent Shareholders’ Rights Directive . To balance these reforms and strengthen 
employees’ position in firm decision-making, the Commission should aim at set-
ting ambitious minimum standards for workers’ information, consultation and 
participation rights in firms that operate in the EU . 
4.2 A New Approach to Structural Reforms in the European Semester 
Besides setting European standards, the Commission also influences national 
economic policymaking, especially through its country-specific recommendations 
(CSRs) in the European Semester . In fact, CSRs have been one of the main tools 
through which the Commission attempts to steer member states towards policies 
that stimulate investment, productivity and growth .18
In the area of industrial relations, CSRs so far often focus on improving competi-
tiveness and the investment climate by reducing employment protection, render-
ing labor markets more flexible and decentralizing wage bargaining .19 While such 
reforms can increase labor productivity, research also shows that they significant-
16 Directive 2009/38/EC: Establishment of a European Works Council. 
17 Importantly, the analysis of data from public listed firms in Germany above, however, 
does not indicate strategic circumvention of the 2000 employee threshold through chan-
ging into SEs .  
18 Verdun and Zeitlin (2018): “The European Semester as a New Architecture of EU Socioeconomic 
Governance in Theory and Practice.”, Journal of European Public Policy 25(2) 137–148 . 
19 Haas, J .; D’Erman V .; Schulz, D .; Verdun, A . (2019): Economic and fiscal policy coordination after 
the crisis: is the European Semester promoting more or less state intervention? Paper prepared for 
the 2019 EUSA International Biennial Conference, Denver Colorado 9–11 May 2019 . 
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ly lower the bargaining power of workers and contribute to higher profit shares .20 
In a context within which rising profits seem increasingly detached from great-
er investment, the Commission, therefore, should rethink which precise mix of 
structural reforms can boost growth and employment . Bolstering the bargaining 
position of labor, for example, through CSRs on strengthening the organizational 
capacities of labor, calling for more employee participation in corporate decisions 
and fostering social dialogue could play an important role in making sure that 
company revenues find their way back into the European economy . Moreover, re-
aligning some of the policy priorities in the European Semester accordingly would 
not only bring labor market CSRs more in line with the goals of the European Pillar 
of Social Rights21 but fit well with the emphasis that Ursula von der Leyen put on 
social dialogue between employers and unions in her political guidelines .22 
5 Conclusion
Europe is in dire need of investment . A key problem is that many European com-
panies have ample profits but do not put them to work in the European economy . 
Instead, corporate saving has been on the rise and has contributed not only to 
faltering investment but also to economic inequality and macroeconomic imbal-
ances in the EU . One of the main challenges in the current economic environment 
is, therefore, how to make sure that companies reinvest their money . 
The findings of this paper suggest that improving the bargaining position of 
workers in firms’ decision making could provide a new and important strategy to 
achieve this goal . As employees have strong stakes in the long-term productivity 
and survival of their firm, they are likely to pressure firms into using revenues for 
both wage growth and investment if they are put in a position to do so . Both com-
parative data across countries and more causal evidence provided by a discontinu-
ity in German law on co-determination support this idea . 
For European institutions this means realigning priorities . On the one hand, Eu-
ropean legislation on corporate governance provides ample room for improving 
worker participation in big firms operating under European law . On the other 
hand, country-specific recommendations in the European Semester often under-
mine instead of improving the bargaining position of workers and employees . Re-
thinking approaches pursued at both levels, therefore, could not only contribute 
to higher growth and investment but also reaffirm Europe’s commitment to social 
dialogue and inclusion .
 
20 Ciminelli, G .; Duval R .; Furceri, D . (2018): Employment Protection Deregulation and Labor 
Shares in Advanced Economies. IMF Working Paper, (18) 186 .  
21 [2017] OJ C428/10 . 
22 Ursula von der Leyen (2019): A Union that strives for more – My agenda for Europe.
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